

# Leidensweg und Trefferbild CIS Benchmark und Härtung für Anfänger



Axel vom Stein – BSS Bohnenberg GmbH



Martin Klier – Performing Databases

# Speaker

- Martin Klier, Oracle ACE Director
- Performing Databases since 2014
- Solution Architect and Database Expert
- My focus:
  - Performance & Tuning
  - Highly Available Systems
  - Cluster and Replication
- Linux since 1997
- Oracle Database since 2003



Oracle ACE  
Director

**SYMPOSIUM** <sup>L2</sup>  
Proud Member of symposium42

# Speaker

- Axel vom Stein, Oracle ACE Pro
- Technical Project Manager, Head of IT
- Working for BSS since 2001
- Oracle:
  - since 2001
  - started out as a developer (PL/SQL, C, C#)
  - interest moved more towards DBA topics
- My focus:
  - teaching trainees and young professionals
  - HA - concepts
  - standardization & automation



Oracle ACE  
Pro



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ora2know

The German Oracle Database Community



**ora2know**

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The German Oracle Database Community

<https://www.ora2know.de>

# Logistics / Warehousing





# Logistics Warehousing



# Logistics – Security


Who let the dogs loose?

Who sent the CISO after the warehouse?

Easy answer: Importance!



# Logistics – Importance



# Logistics – Responsibility



CEO? Logistics is just an expensive asset.

CFO? Wants to earn and not to lose money.

CIO? Bears the IT load on shoulders.

CISO? Priority: Security First. Who needs a business?

COO? The shop must run!

CTO? ...


C...?

Head of Logistics?

**CLO!** (Nice – “Klo” is the German word for “loo”)

It depends!

# Logistics – Challenges



Let's communicate!





Non-IT pain: Physical security with truck drivers, technicians, craftsmen ....

# Security is a Feature!




Security is a good feature for our product.



# Logistics – Worst Case




# Attacks – From the Inside?



Be prepared - You never know their strategy!

# Hardening



It's not just a project -  
prepare your product!

# Hardening – Why?

- Don't be the one to blame – it's expensive!
- Good feature for a product
- Rather do it by design than by pressure
- There is a lot of Evil out there!
- Better Safe than Sorry



# Hardening – Guidelines

- Own, self-defined rules
- **BSI** Base Protection = German Federal IT Security Agency
- **CIS** Level 1+2 = Center for Internet Security
- **DISA\*** **STIG** = Security Technical Implementation Guide  
= CIS Level 3

\* Defense Information System Agency

# Hardening – Guidelines

- Own, self-defined rules => Do not do it (only)
- BSI Base Protection => Not known outside Germany
- CIS Level 1+2 => International semi-standard
- DISA\* STIG => Too strict for many non-military purposes

\* Defense Information System Agency

# CIS Level 1 – Lower the Attack Surface


- Level 2 contains Level 1 => Start small
- Keep business impact at bay
- Oracle supports it with DBSAT
- “Keeping machines usable” (CIS quote!)  
(makes me feel bad about Level 2 or STIG ...)



# What is the Definition of Enough?

- Percent-counters happy with 80% Green?
  - 390 of 500 rules implemented?
    - Pen-Test survived?
      - Unpredictable CISO happy?
        - Admin has a good feeling?
          - Business still working?

=> Too many bees for the (little) honey!





# Know where you are – CIS Benchmark

# CIS Benchmark – Document









## CIS Oracle Linux 8 Benchmark

v3.0.0 - 10-30-2023

**pdf has 1011 pages**



# The right Benchmark-Tool ... ?

		
	CIS CAT Pro ...?	 <b>DBSAT</b> Database Security Assessment Tool
	CIS CAT Pro Tenable Rapid7	 OpenSCAP



OpenSCAP

# How to do it

Oracle has a guide for OL8 and OpenSCAP:

<https://docs.oracle.com/en/operating-systems/oracle-linux/8/oscap/>

Create the report:

```
oscap xccdf eval
--fetch-remote-resources
--datastream-id
    scap_org.open-scap_datastream_from_xccdf_ssg-rhel8-xccdf.xml
--xccdf-id scap_org.open-scap_cref_ssg-rhel8-xccdf.xml
--profile xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_profile_cis_server_l1
--report report-level1.html
    scap-security-guide-0.1.73/ssg-rhel8-ds-1.2.xml
```

**Data Stream File**





## OpenSCAP Evaluation Report

### Guide to the Secure Configuration of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8

with profile **CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Benchmark for Level 1 - Server**  
— This profile defines a baseline that aligns to the "Level 1 - Server" configuration from the Center for Internet Security® Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Benchmark™, v3.0.0, released 2023-10-30.

Oracle Linux 8  
No Level 1/2  
Only STIG ... ☹️

### Compliance and Scoring

The target system did not satisfy the conditions of 99 rules! Furthermore, the results of 19 rules were inconclusive. Please review rule results and consider applying remediation.

#### Rule results



#### Severity of failed rules



#### Score

Scoring system	Score	Maximum	Percent
urn:xccdf:scoring:default	68.003166	100.000000	<div><div></div></div> 68%

Title	Severity	Result
▼ Guide to the Secure Configuration of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 99x fail 16x error 3x unknown		
▼ System Settings 87x fail		
▼ Installing and Maintaining Software 12x fail		
▼ System and Software Integrity 6x fail		
▼ Software Integrity Checking 4x fail		
▼ Verify Integrity with AIDE 4x fail		
Install AIDE	medium	fail
Build and Test AIDE Database	medium	fail
Configure AIDE to Verify the Audit Tools	medium	fail
Configure Periodic Execution of AIDE	medium	fail
▼ System Cryptographic Policies 2x fail		
Configure System Cryptography Policy	high	fail
Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy	medium	fail
▼ Disk Partitioning 1x fail		
Ensure /dev/shm is configured	low	pass
Ensure /tmp Located On Separate Partition	low	fail
► GNOME Desktop Environment		
▼ Sudo 4x fail		
Install sudo Package	medium	pass
Ensure Only Users Logged In To Realm Can Execute Sudo	medium	fail

Categories

Single Rules

Importance  
Status



# Detail: System Settings vs. Rules

## Uninstall vsftpd Package

Rule ID	Check Ref. Status	xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_vsftpd_removed
Result		fail
Multi-check rule		no
OVAL Definition ID		oval:ssg-package_vsftpd_removed:def:1
Time		2024-06-05T09:17:31+01:00
Severity	Importance?	high
Identifiers and References	What?	<b>Identifiers:</b> CCE-82414-4 <b>References:</b> 11, 14, 3, 9, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS06.06, CCI-000197, CCI-000366, CCI-000381, 4.3.3.4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 7.6, A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.9.1.2, CM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a), IA-5(1)(c), IA-5(1).1(v), C 000480-GPOS-00227, RHEL-08-040360, 2.2.7, SV-230558r627750_rule
Description	Why?	The <b>vsftpd</b> package can be removed with the following command: <pre>\$ sudo yum erase vsftpd</pre>
Rationale		Removing the <b>vsftpd</b> package decreases the risk of its accidental activation.

Remediation Ansible snippet ↗

Remediation Puppet snippet ↗

Remediation Shell script ↗

Remediation Anaconda snippet ↗

Remediation!  
(for the lazy)



# Suggested Remediation Scripts

Remediation Ansible snippet ↘

Remediation Puppet snippet ↘

Remediation Shell script ↘

Complexity:	low
Disruption:	low
Reboot:	false
Strategy:	disable

```
# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove vsftpd
#           from the system, and may remove any packages
#           that depend on vsftpd. Execute this
#           remediation AFTER testing on a non-production
#           system!
```

```
if rpm -q --quiet "vsftpd" ; then
    yum remove -y "vsftpd"
fi
```

**Remediation!**  
(for the lazy)

Remediation Anaconda snippet ↘



OpenSCAP

# Remediation "Session Timeout"

## Set Interactive Session Timeout

Rule ID	xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_tmout
Result	<div><div></div>fail</div>

Setting the **TMOUT** option in **/etc/profile** ensures that all user sessions will terminate based on inactivity. The value of TMOUT should be exported and read only. The **TMOUT** setting in a file loaded by **/etc/profile**, e.g. **/etc/profile.d/tmout.sh** should read as follows:

```
typeset -xr TMOUT=900
```

or

```
declare -xr TMOUT=900
```

Using the **typeset** keyword is preferred for wide

Terminating an idle session within a short time per  
the console or console port that has been left una

```
[oracle@dagobah ~]$  
[oracle@dagobah ~]$  
[oracle@dagobah ~]$ TMOUT=10  
[oracle@dagobah ~]$  
[oracle@dagobah ~]$  
[oracle@dagobah ~]$  
[oracle@dagobah ~]$ timed out waiting for input: auto-logout  
Connection to dagobah.ws27.srv.performing-db.com closed.  
odysseus:~ usn$  
odysseus:~ usn$
```

Can be really annoying

# Strange and Funny Things

## “Modify the System Login Banner for Remote Connections”

Modify the System Login Banner for Remote Connections	
Rule ID	xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_banner_etc_issue_net
Result	fail
Multi-check rule	no
OVAL Definition ID	oval:ssg-banner_etc_issue_net:def:1
Time	2024-06-05T09:16:56+01:00
Severity	medium
Identifiers and References	<b>Identifiers:</b> CCE-86147-6 <b>References:</b> CCI-000048, CCI-001384, CCI-001385, CCI-001386, CCI-001387, CCI-001388, SRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006, SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088, 1.7.3
Description	<p>To configure the system login banner edit <code>/etc/issue.net</code>. Replace the default text with a message compliant with the local site policy or a legal disclaimer. The DoD required text is either:</p> <pre>You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions: -The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. -At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS. -Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose. -This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests -- not for your personal benefit or privacy. -Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details.</pre> <p>OR:</p> <pre>I've read &amp; consent to terms in IS user agreem't.</pre>
Rationale	<p>Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.</p> <p>System use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist.</p>
Remediation Ansible snippet	

THIS and NOTHING ELSE! =>

We are not US Government....?



OpenSCAP

# Strange and Funny Things

“Enable Kernel Parameter to **Log Martian Packets** on all IPv4 Interfaces”

To set the runtime status of the `net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians` kernel parameter, run the following command:

```
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians=1
```

To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory `/etc/sysctl.d`:

```
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
```

WTH is this, and what's the impact on my operations?

Aliens, congregate!




# Strange and Funny Things

“Enable Kernel Parameter to **Log Martian Packets** on all IPv4 Interfaces”

WTH is this, and what’s the impact on my operations?

Why is not LOGGING it a security issue?





# SELinux Security Enhanced Linux



- Mandatory Access-Control (MAC) on resources
- De-facto additional Security “Layer”
- Required for CIS Level 1(++)
- Makes Oracle (RAC) setup fail, big time!

# Oracle DBSAT Database Security Assessment Tool



V.3.1.0 covers CIS, STIG and Oracle Best Practices (e.g. for GDPR etc.)  
MOS DOC ID 2138254.1

Default config in **discover.conf**  
is quite simple:

DB\_HOSTNAME  
DB\_PORT  
DB\_SERVICENAME  
SCHEMA\_SCOPE  
EXCLUSION\_LIST\_FILE

Run it w/o SYS privileges – you need GRANTS:

```
CREATE SESSION  
SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE  
SELECT ON sys.registry$history  
READ ON sys.dba_audit_mgmt_config_params  
SELECT ON sys.dba_users_with_defpwd  
READ ON sys.dba_credentials  
EXECUTE ON sys.dbms_sql  
AUDIT_VIEWER  
CAPTURE_ADMIN
```

# Oracle DBSAT

## Database Security Assessment Tool

### Syntax

```
-- dbsat COLLECTOR
./dbsat collect bss_db_sat/secret@10.1.2.3:1521/MYDB dbsat.out

-- dbsat REPORTER
ZIP=/usr/bin/zip
UNZIP=/usr/bin/unzip
DBZIP=${ORACLE_HOME}/bin/zip

./dbsat report dbsat.out
```

# Oracle DBSAT

## Database Security Assessment Tool

### Security Report:

### Oracle Database Security Assessment

Highly Sensitive

#### Assessment Date & Time

Date of Data Collection	Date of Report	Reporter Version
Fri May 24 2024 09:04:02 UTC+02:00	Fri May 24 2024 09:48:59 UTC+02:00	3.1 (Apr 2024) - 388e

#### Database Identity

Name	Container (Type:ID)	Platform	Database Role	Log Mode	Created
RMBWP	RMBWDBE (PDB:4)	Linux x86 64-bit	PRIMARY	NOARCHIVELOG	Wed Aug 02 2023 16:37:33 UTC+02:00

#### Summary

Section	Pass	Evaluate	Advisory	Low Risk	Medium Risk	High Risk	Total Findings
<a href="#">Basic Information</a>	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<a href="#">User Accounts</a>	8	9	0	4	2	0	23
<a href="#">Privileges and Roles</a>	6	21	1	0	0	1	29
<a href="#">Authorization Control</a>	0	3	2	0	0	0	5

# Oracle DBSAT

## Database Security Assessment Tool

### Patch Check

Security  
Report:

**INFO.PATCH** CIS OBP STIG

The Oracle Database should be patched

<b>Status</b>	High Risk
<b>Summary</b>	Oracle Database version is supported but latest patch is missing. Latest comprehensive patch has not been applied.
<b>Details</b>	Latest patch not applied for a supported database version. Binary Patch Inventory: Patch ID (Comprehensive): 25314491 (created July 2023)  Installed SQL Patch History:

## References

Oracle Best Practice

CIS Benchmark: Recommendation 1.1

DISA STIG: V-237697, V-237748, V-251802

It is vital to keep the database software up-to-date with security fixes as they are released. Oracle issues comprehensive patches in the form of Release Updates on a regular quarterly schedule. These updates should be applied as soon as they are available.

**References**  
Oracle Best Practice  
CIS Benchmark: Recommendation 1.1  
DISA STIG: V-237697, V-237748, V-251802

# Oracle DBSAT Database Security Assessment Tool

Sensitive  
Data  
Report:

## Oracle Database Sensitive Data Assessment

### Discovery Parameters

Parameter	Values
Schema Scope	ALL
Exclusion List File	NONE
Minimum Rows Count	1
Pattern File(s)	sensitive_en.ini

### Summary

Sensitive Category	# Sensitive Tables	# Sensitive Columns	# Sensitive Rows
BIOGRAPHIC INFO – ADDRESS	7	13	266
BIOGRAPHIC INFO – EXTENDED PII	2	2	6
FINANCIAL INFO – BANK DATA	25	69	17141
HEALTH INFO – MEDICAL DATA	7	16	7510
IDENTIFICATION INFO – PERSONAL IDS	21	61	12971
IDENTIFICATION INFO – PUBLIC IDS	1	1	36
IT INFO – DEVICE DATA	44	93	36780
IT INFO – USER DATA	42	125	32293
JOB INFO – COMPENSATION DATA	3	6	273
JOB INFO – EMPLOYEE DATA	31	104	18826



# Oracle DBSAT Database Security Assessment Tool

Sensitive  
Data  
Report:

## Tables Detected within Sensitive Category: HEALTH INFO – MEDICAL DATA

<b>Risk Level</b>	Medium Risk
<b>Summary</b>	Found HEALTH INFO – MEDICAL DATA within 16 Column(s) in 7 Table(s)
<b>Location</b>	Tables: BSS_LOG, INDEXREBUILD_LOG,



BSS_LOG	INDEXREBUILD_LOG	N__HEIGHT	after: height of the b-tree	HEALTH INFO – HEIGHT MEDICAL DATA	Medium Risk
BSS_LOG	INDEXREBUILD_LOG	V__HEIGHT	before: height of the b-tree	HEALTH INFO – HEIGHT MEDICAL DATA	Medium Risk

Fine-tune **discover.conf** and **sensitive\_en.ini** for more sanity 😊



# Lessons Learned

# Two Ways to Hardening

- From Scratch (Security is a Feature, Security by Design)
- By Change (Never Change ....., Security by Option)

# Hardening from Scratch - Security by Design

- Needs to be planned
  - Product budget
  - Collisions w/ other features
- Maximum Principle
  - As much as possible
  - (Hopefully) no exceptions

# Hardening on Demand - Security by Option

- Pops up at a random time
  - Project budget = Customizing
  - Collisions w/ tested features  
AND project timelines
- Minimum Principle
  - As little as possible, just pass the benchmark
  - Exceptions are necessary

# Security ...

	KnowHow	Time & Money	Testing
by Design	Know, how to do it “the right way”	Product phase slower/expensive	Modular by development progress
on Demand	Know a grown product and its “hacks” very well	Do (much of) it again in every project “F.I.A.T.”	Monolithic Test everything at once

# Hardening Lessons Learned


- WTH are TCP SYN\_cookies ?  
You will forget special knowledge soon!
- You get off track quickly  
Deep dives into nothing ...
- Hardening makes maintenance complicated

# More Hardening Lessons Learned

- Report is “Green” – but it’s just a snapshot  
Maintain hardening continuously!
- Is “OK” for your tool also OK?  
OpenSCAP can be a bastard!
- Changes are quick.  
But Testing takes a lot of time (e.g. GRUB pw)

# Security Lessons Learned

- Part-time job? You need a Security Team!  
KnowHow, Priorities, Budget ...
- Hard to argument costs & efforts  
(Expensive insurance and never sick)
- Jumphost Chain from Hell





What's next?

To be continued ... XDR



Yes, we heard of Oracle (RAC) ...



Yes, we heard of  
CrowdStrike Falcon ....

THANK YOU VERY MUCH!

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